The Evolving Constitutional Rights of Nonmarital Children:  Mixed Blessings by Dale, Michael J.
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 5
Issue 2 Spring 1989 Article 1
March 2012
The Evolving Constitutional Rights of Nonmarital
Children: Mixed Blessings
Michael J. Dale
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Peach Sheet is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael J. Dale, The Evolving Constitutional Rights of Nonmarital Children: Mixed Blessings, 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. (2012).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol5/iss2/1
HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 523 1988-1989
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME 5 NUMBER 2 SPRING 1989 
THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
OF NONMARITAL CHILDREN: MIXED 
BLESSINGS 
Michael J. Dalet 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, 1,820,000 children were living with unmarried parents 
in the United States.1 In just five years the number doubled. By 
1985, 3,756,000 children under the age of eighteen were living 
with a never-married parent.2 Between 1984 and 1985 there was 
an eight percent increase in nonmarital births to women between 
the ages of fifteen and forty-four.3 For the period between 1975 
and 1985 almost seventeen percent of all children born in the 
United States were the offspring of unwed mothers.4 In fact, by 
t Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center. B.A. 1967, Colgate 
University; J.D. 1970, Boston College. This Article is based upon a speech given at the 
1987 Annual Convention of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. The speech 
was published in 9 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 9 (Winter 1988). The author wishes to thank 
Barbara Monahan for her assistance in the research of this article. 
1. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., DATA MATERIALS 
RELATED TO WELFARE PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN (Comm. Print 1987). 
2.Id. 
3. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS ADVANCE REPORT OF FINAL NATALITY 
STATISTICS, 36 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS, No.4 (Supp. July 17, 1987). The 
specific increase was from 770,355 to 828,174. This increase is the largest since 1980. 
4. For a description of the statistics during the mid-1970's, see Caban v. Mohammed, 
441 U.S. 380, 402 n.2 (1979). 
523 
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1984, twenty-one percent of all mothers giving birth to children 
in the United States were unwed.5 The social and legal 
ramifications of such a substantial population of children born 
out-of-wedlock are significant. These statistics explain why cases 
involving issues of illegitimacy have been decided by the United 
States Supreme Court ten times during the period between 1975 
and 1985.6 
Putative fathers,7 natural mothers, and nonmarital8 children 
have sought review in the Supreme Court raising issues of 
illegitimacy. The litigation, although disparate in factual context, 
may be divided into three categories. The case categories include 
constitutional challenges by putative fathers to dependency, 
adoption, and paternity proceedings, claims by nonmarital children 
5. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS DATA, ADVANCE REpORTS OF FINAL 
NATALITY STATISTICS. 37 MONTHLY VITAL STATTSTICS REpORTS, No.3 (Supp. June 12, 1987). 
This number was up from 21 percent in 1984. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEp'T OF COMMERCE. 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1987). 
6. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills 
v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23 (1980); Califano v. 
Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli. 439 
U.S. 259 (1978); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon. 430 U.S. 762 
(1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
An additional three cases were decided between 1968 and 1!Yl4. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 
417 U.S. 628 (1974); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.s. 535 (1973); Stanley v. illinois. 405 U.S. 645 
(1972). The number of decisions during the entire period is even higher when one includes 
cases in which illegitimacy was of only factual significance or in which an illegitimacy 
issue was raised but not decided. These cases include New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. 
v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1!Yl3) (welfare benefits); Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 
406 U.S. 164 (1972) (worker's compensation); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) 
!intestacy); Glona v. American Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (wrongful 
death); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrongful death); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 
F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), afj'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 
1226 (Md.), afj'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972) (social security benefits); and Davis v. Richardson, 
342 F. Supp. 588 (Conn.), afj'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). For a detailed analysis of these cases 
and United States Supreme Court cases through 1980, see Kellett, The Burger Decade: 
More Than Toothless Scrutiny for Laws Affecting illegitimates, 57 DET. J. OF URB. L. 791 
(1980); Martin, Legal Rights of the Unwed Father, 102 MIL. L. REV. 67 (1983); Stenger, 
Expanding Constitutional Rights of illegitimate Children, 1968-1980, 19 J. FAM. L. 407 
(1981); and for an analysis of pre-1968 cases see Krause, Equal Protection for the illegiti-
mate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967), and Martin, Legal Rights of the illegitimate Child. 102 
MIL. L. REv. 67 (1983). 
7. The term "putative father" is synonymous with the term "unwed father" and is 
defined as "[tJhe alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979). 
8. The term "nonmarital children" is used in this Article because of the recently 
recognized pejorative connotation of the word "illegitimate." For a discussion of this 
issue, see Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adopti.on Laws and Proposals 
for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10,53 n.228 (1975) and Note, The Unwed Father 
and the Right to Krww of His Child's Existence, 76 Ky. L.J. 949, 949 n.2 (1987 -88), 
2
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to the estates of their putative fathers, and support actions 
involving both public benefits and child support. All claims have 
been based upon alleged denials of due process and equal 
protection. The Court has responded by recognizing the application 
of procedural and substantive due process and equal protection 
principles to these claims. 
In the due process context, the Court's opinions demonstrate 
that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a 
liberty interest protected by the procedural due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. This protection extends to families 
in which the parents are not married but have children. With 
respect to substantive due process, the Court has said that 
parents and children have a liberty interest in the family unit 
even if the parents are not married. The Court will balance the 
interest of the members of the family against the interests of 
the state when deciding whether state policy or law may be 
imposed upon members of the family and if so, to what extent. 
In addressing equal protection claims, the Court has held that 
discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy is impermissible if the 
governmental purpose is to punish the child for the parents' 
failure to conduct themselves in accordance with society's laws 
and moral rules. The state must have some other substantial 
reason if it wishes to treat nonmarital children differently than 
marital children.9 
Challenges by nonmarital children have been relatively 
successful before the Supreme Court. This success is particularly 
evident in comparison to the outcome of cases in which children 
are in conflict with their parents or the government and the 
issue is something other than the child's legitimacy status.10 In 
such contexts as juvenile crime, mental health, abuse and neglect, 
and education, the Court has tended to favor the state. The Court 
has deferred to the judgment of state officials in cases involving 
conflicts between the child and the state or between the parent 
and the state.H When the dispute is between parent and child, 
9. This Article supports the position that the Court's equal protection analyses have 
been fairly consistent. For a different view see Comment, Adoption and the Putative 
Father's Rights: Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services Bureau, 13 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 
231, 232 (1988). 
10. Cf. Note, Children's Rights Under The Burger Court: Concern For The Child But 
Defim:nce To Authority, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1214 (1985) [hereinafter Children's Rights]. 
11. Dale, The Burger Court and Children's Rights-A Trend Toward Retribution? 8 
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 7 (19871; Stern, The Burger Court and the Diminishing Consti-
tutional Right.$ of Minors: A Brief Overview, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 865 (1985); Children's 
Rights, supra note 10. 
3
Dale: The Evolving Constitutional Rights of Nonmarital Children:  Mixed
Published by Reading Room, 1989
HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 526 1988-1989
526 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.5:523 
the Court usually has sided with the parent.12 However, in 
nonmarital status cases, a more equal balance has been struck 
among children, parents, and the state. 
This Article analyzes the Supreme Court opinions over the 
past twenty years in the area of nonmarital status with particular 
attention to the subjects of dependency, adoption, paternity, 
inheritance, and financial assistance and government benefits for 
nonmarital children. The Article describes the sometimes 
inconsistent Supreme Court application of procedural due process, 
substantive due process, and equal protection concepts, which 
nonetheless generally strikes a proper balance among the interests 
of nonmarital children, the state, and other parties to these 
proceedings. The Article demonstrates that the Court often 
obliterates any equal protection distinctions unrelated to 
substantial government interests. Although the Court applies 
both procedural and substantive due process protections when 
constitutionally and pragmatically appropriate, in the area of 
government benefits, a level of tension exists with respect to 
equal protection. This tension is based in part upon differences 
in the Justices' interpretations of legislative history and their 
divergent societal value judgments. Because statutory construction 
may be the battleground in the fight of nonmarital children for 
equal treatment, the outcome remains unpredictable. 
Finally, the Article suggests an explanation for the somewhat 
better treatment of nonmarital children than children generally 
in their cases before the Supreme Court over the past twenty 
years. Nonmarital children have been more successful because 
their claims generally do not challenge directly either the family 
or the government. For example, in the field of education, children 
have challenged the authority of the school system;13 in the 
delinquency area, children have challenged the authority of the 
court;14 and in the mental health commitment area, children have 
12. Cf. Parham v. J.R .• 442 U.S. 584 (1979); but see Rivera v. Minnich. 107 S. Ct. 3001 
(1987). 
13. See. e.g .• Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988); Bethel School 
Dist. v. Fraser. 478 U.S. 675 (1986); New Jersey v. T.L.O .• 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Ingraham 
v. Wright. 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.s. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
14. See. e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 
253 (1984); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978); 
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. 403 U.S. 520 (1971); In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 
U.S. 541 (1966); High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988 (1987), cert. granted sub nom. High v. Zant, 
4
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challenged the authority of their parents.15 Although the Court 
has been unwilling to favor the rights of children over these 
various types of authority, in the nonmarital status area no such 
threat to authority exists. To the contrary, the outcome in many 
of the cases may be viewed as beneficial to the state. For 
example, nonmarital children who gain an entitlement to a putative 
father's estate are less likely to be in need of government services 
in the form of public assistance. However, the challenges to 
government benefits have been more difficult cases for the 
nonmarital child to win, specifically because the suits have involved 
direct challenges to governmental authority and governmental 
purse strings. 
I. DEPENDENCY, ADOPTION, AND PATERNITY 
The family integrity cases concern putative fathers who either 
were denied the right to participate in or challenge proceedings 
involving the legal status of their nonmarital children or who 
sought to disclaim responsibility for the children. The more recent 
claims are based upon the 1972 decision in Stanley v. Rlinois,l6 
in which the Supreme Court ruled that in a dependency 
proceeding, it is unconstitutional to presume that an unwed father 
is unfitP 
In a victory for both the father and the children, the Supreme 
Court decided that the father's interest in the "companionship, 
care, custody, and management" of his children is recognized as 
both a due process and equal protection right.Is The due process 
right was procedural in nature, arising from the failure of the 
Illinois Juvenile Court Act to provide any notice or hearing rights 
to the father.19 The equal protection claim arose from the Act's 
provisions, which defined "parents" as including mothers of 
nonmarital children but excluding fathers of nonmarital children.20 
108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988); Wilkens v. Missouri, 736 S.W.2d 409 (1987), cert. granted, 108 S. 
Ct. 2896 (1988). 
15. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
16. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
17. Stanley v. Dlinois, 405 U.S. at 649. When the unwed mother died, the state 
deelared the children to be wards of the state and removed them from Stanley's custody 
without any hearing or determination that he was an unfit parent. Mr. Stanley lived 
with all three ehildren over a period of 18 years and yet, was provided with no opportunity 
to challenge the state's action. Id. at 646. 
18. Id. at 651. 
19. Id. at 658. 
20. Id. at 650. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 (1967). 
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The Court further held that the children could not be taken away 
from the father in the absence of a hearing and a determination 
that the father was unfit.21 It is not clear from Justice White's 
majority opinion whether the Court based its holding on due 
process or equal protection grounds or some combination of the 
two. One explanation for the Court's decision may be that Stanley 
appealed to the Supreme Court solely on equal protection 
grounds.22 Irrespective of the specific constitutional basis, Stanley 
is a very important case because for the first time the Supreme 
Court held that the concept of family integrity may be 
constitutionally protected beyond the traditional nuclear family.23 
However, the expected shock waves from this expansion of the 
concept of the family were not felt immediately. 
Although Stanley dealt with both procedural due process and 
equal protection issues involving nonmarital children, the case 
arose as a dependency proceeding. The questions left unanswered 
by Stanley were whether procedural due process, substantive 
due process, and equal protection concepts may be applied to an 
unwed father in an adoption situation and, if so, to what extent. 
The Supreme Court first addressed these issues in Quilloin v. 
Walcott.24 At issue in Quilloin was a putative father's challenge 
to Georgia's adoption law on both procedural due process and 
equal protection grounds. Quilloin sought to stop the adoption of 
his nonmarital child even though the child's mother had custody 
and control of the child for his entire life and Quilloin and the 
mother had never married nor established a home together.25 
Approximately two years after the child was born, the mother 
married another man. When the mother consented to the adoption 
of the child by her husband, Quilloin attempted to block the 
21. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. The finding of unfitness refers to a dependency adjudi· 
cation on parental qualifications, similar to that which occurs in situations in which the 
father and mother of the child had been married. Id. 
22. Id. at 647. For a discussion of the lack of specificity in the opinion see Note, The 
Impact of Stanley v. illinois on Custody Proceedings for illegitimate Children: Procedural 
Parity for the Putative Father? 3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 31, 36 (1973); Comment, 
A Dependency Hearing Which Would Deny an Unwed Father Custody of His Child on the 
Death of Its Mother Without Reference to the Father's Fitness as a Parent is Violative of 
Due Process and Equal Protection, 4 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 176, 181 (1973); and Comment, 
Delineation of the Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights: A Psychological Parenthood 
Perspective, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 290,300-01 (1985). 
23. The pre·Stanley cases dealt with traditional nuclear families. &e, e.g., Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
24. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
25. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at 247. 
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adoption and secure visitation rights.26 The Georgia statute 
provided that in order to be afforded the same right that divorced 
or separated parents have to object to a proposed adoption, the 
father of a child born out-of-wedlock was obligated to legitimate 
the child by either marrying the mother and acknowledging that 
the child was his or by obtaining a court order declaring the 
child legitimate and capable of inheriting from the father.Zl Quilloin 
had done neither of these things. In Georgia, until either action 
occurred, courts recognized only the mother as the child's parent.28 
Justice Marshall applied both due process and equal protection 
analyses in Quilloin.29 He concluded that the father's substantive 
due process rights were not violated by the application of a "best 
interests of the child" standard in determining whether the father 
should be allowed to legitimate the child or whether the adoption 
should go forward.30 Such a test was appropriate because Quilloin 
had never sought custody of his child.31 This holding seems to 
balance the unwed father's interests in his family against the 
state's interest in giving full protection to an already existing 
family unit.32 However, the Court was somewhat reticent in its 
holding. As the Court noted, "[w]hatever might be required in 
other situations, we cannot say that the State was required in 
26. ld. 
27. ld. at 249. One Georgia statute provided: "If the child be illegitimate, the consent 
of the mother alone shall suffice. Such consent, however, shall not be required if the 
mother has surrendered all of her rights to said child to a licensed child-placing agency, 
or to the State Department of Family and Children Services." ld. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. 
S 74-403(3) (1975)). 
The other relevant statute provided: 
A father of an illegitimate child may render the same legitimate by peti-
tioning the superior court of the county of his residence, setting forth the 
name, age, and sex of such child, and also the name of the mother; and if 
he desires the name changed, stating the new name, and praying the 
legitimation of such child. Of this application the mother, if alive, shall have 
notice. Upon such application, presented and rued, the court may pass an 
order declaring said child to be legitimate, and capable of inheriting from 
the father in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock, and the name 
by which he or she shall be known. 
!d. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. S 74-103 (1975)). 
28. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 249. 
29. Id. at 254-56. Although Quilloin did not raise the issue, the Court found that he 
had received adequate procedural due process when he was given an opportunity to be 
heard on his legitimation petition under Georgia law. ld. at 253-54. 
30. !d. at 255. 
31. Id. Quilloin did have a relationship with his son. He often visited with the child 
and gave him gifts "from time to time." ld. at 251. 
32. !d. at 254-55. 
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this situation to find anything more than that the adoption, and 
denial of legitimation, were in the 'best interests of the child.' "33 
Quilloin is also important for what the Court did not decide. 
In his equal protection challenge, Quilloin only raised the issue 
of the distinction between the rights of married fathers and 
unmarried fathers. Thus, the Court did not rule on differences 
between mothers of nonmarital children and fathers of nonmarital 
children.34 The Court distinguished Quilloin's interests from those 
of the separated or divorced father, finding that Quilloin had not 
accepted the day-to-day parental responsibilities imposed upon 
the divorced or separated father and that this distinction allowed 
for a difference in the protection provided by the state's adoption 
law.35 
The Quilloin case demonstrates that to challenge an adoption, 
the putative father must make a specific and timely effort to 
legitimate the child by marrying the child's mother, obtaining a 
court order, or otherwise complying with state law. In other 
words, the father must have undertaken some affirmative act. 
Just what steps one must take to establish a protectible interest 
remained open to question. Two subsequent cases, Caban v. 
Mohammed36 and Lehr v. Robertson,37 also dealt with putative 
fathers' challenges to the adoption of their children. However, 
Caban was an equal protection challenge and thus did not deal 
with the standards a putative father must meet to challenge an 
adoption. On the other hand, Lehr was a particularly unsuccessful 
effort by the Court to address the issue of such standards. 
Caban v. Mohammed is similar to Quilloin as it also involved 
a father's challenge to the adoption of his two children by their 
stepfather without Caban's consent. However, unlike Quilloin, 
Caban involved a sex-based equal protection challenge. Justice 
Powell, ruling that the New York statute impermissibly 
distinguished between the rights of unmarried mothers and 
unmarried fathers, applied what often is referred to as the 
intermediate equal protection test. He found no substantially 
related important state interest to allow for the discrimination.as 
33. fd. at 255. 
34. fd. at 253 n.13. 
35. fd. at 256. 
36. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
37. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
38. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 394. Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived 
together in New York City between 1968 and 1973 although they were never married. 
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The New York statute challenged in Caban allowed the mother 
to consent to the adoption without the consent of the father 
unless the father could show that the adoption was not in the 
children's best interest; however, the mother's consent was 
required if the father brought the adoption proceedings.39 
According to the Supreme Court, this gender-based distinction 
has to "serve some important governmental objectives" and must 
be "substantially related" to the achievement of such purpose or 
an equal protection violation would result .. 4O The Court rejected 
the claim that this kind of gender distinction "is required by any 
universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at 
every phase of a child's development."41 The Court also did not 
hold that the distinction between unmarried mothers and 
unmarried fathers bore a substantial relation to a state interest 
in providing adoptive nomes for nonmarital children. It found no 
difference in the degree to which unwed fathers would object to 
adoption as opposed to unwed mothers. Thus: 
The effect of New York's classification was to discriminate 
against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and 
they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the 
child. The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of clas-
sifying unwed fathers as being invariably less qualified and 
ld. at 382. In fact. until 1974. although separated. Caban was married to another woman. 
During the time Caban and Mohammed were living together. they had two children. 
Caban was identified as the father on each birth certificate. and he lived with and 
supported the children until late 1973. In December 1973. Mohammed left Caban. taking 
the two children. and in January 1974. married another man. After the marriage. Caban 
continued to see his children. ld. at 382. At one point. Caban took custody of the children. 
resulting in the commencement of a custody proceeding by Mohammed in which she was 
successful. Thereafter. she and Mr. Mohammed filed a petition seeking to allow her new 
husband to adopt the children. Caban cross-petitioned for adoption. The New York 
Surrogate Court granted the Mohammeds' petition for adoption and cut off all Mr. Caban's 
rights and obligations after it found that his consent to the adoption was not necessary. 
ld. at 383-84. 
39. Section 111 of the N.Y. DaM. REL. LAW (McKinney 1977) provided that consent by 
a parent to an adoption is unnecessary in cases in which the parent abandoned the child, 
relinquished parental rights. or suffered termination of parental rights. Unless the mother 
fell into such a category. she could not only contest adoption but actually block it by 
withholding consent. ld. at 385-86. 
40. ld. at 388. The Court's language is taken from Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-
99 (1976), which applied the intermediate standard of review for gender-based discrimi-
nation. For a criticism of the application of this standard in Cahan. see Weinhaus, 
Substa.ntil'e Rights of the Unwed Father: The B&Undari.es Are Defined, 19 J. FAM. L. 445 
(1980-81). 
41. Cahan, 441 U.S. at 389. 
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entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned judgment as 
to the fate of their children.42 
In essence, the Court could find no countervailing governmental 
interest of any kind in Caban. It did recognize that there might 
be situations in which the state could deny a father veto power 
over the adoption oi his child when the father had never taken 
part in raising his child.43 However, in Caban the Court found 
that the "undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers 
and unwed fathers, applicable in all circumstances where adoption 
of a child of theirs is at issue, [did] not bear a substantial 
relationship to the State's asserted interests."44 Thus, the New 
York statute violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment.45 
In contrast, Justice Stewart's dissent found the distinction 
between unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers under New 
York law insufficient to constitute an equal protection violation.46 
There is a certain pragmatic logic in Justice Stewart's dissent. 
Under New York law, fathers who have custody of children, even 
when the child is illegitimate, are given a veto power over 
adoptions.47 Why should the unwed father who does not have 
custody of the child and who has not legitimated the child by 
marrying the mother have the right to veto the child's adoption? 
New York law provides that an unwed father has the right to 
challenge the adoption on the merits and show that the adoption 
is not in the child's best interests.48 In Stewart's view, this right 
is an acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of the 
42. Id. at 394. The dissent argued forcefully that the "best interests of the child" 
standard in this kind of a family situation is not unconstitutionally discriminatory because 
the standard represents a careful effort by the state to balance competing interests and 
to promote the welfare of children. Id. at 395 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
43. Id. at 392. 
44. Id. at 394. 
45. Id. As in Quilloin, the appellant made no procedural due process claim because 
Caban received notice and an opportunity to participate as a party in the underlying 
adoption proceeding. Id. at 385 n.3. However, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), 
Caban did make a substantive due process claim, arguing that the termination of parental 
rights occurred without first finding the father unfit. Id. at 394 n.16. Because the Court 
ruled in his favor on the equal protection claim, it did not reach Caban's substantive due 
process claim. Id. Caban also made a second equal protection claim, asserting that New 
York impermissibly discriminated between married and unmarried fathers. The Court 
elected not to address this issue as well. Id. 
46. Id. at 398-401 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
47. Id. at 395 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW S l11(l)(d) (McKinney 1977)). 
48. Id. 
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parents, state, and child and thus does not violate the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.49 Under the 
majority's interpretation, this system for challenging adoption is 
constitutionally inadequate. 
A much more difficult question was presented to the Court in 
Lehr v. Robertson.50 The issue in Lehr was whether an unmarried 
father who had never supported and had never seen his child 
since her birth two years earlier had an absolute right under the 
due process clause to notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before the child was adopted.51 In Lehr the child's unmarried 
mother subsequently married a man who sought to adopt the 
child. Under New York law, notice of adoption proceedings had 
to be given to certain classes of fathers of children born out of 
wedlock including 
those who have been identified as the father on the child's 
birth certificate, those who live openly with the child and the 
child's mother and who hold themselves out to be the father, 
those who have been identified as the father by the mother 
in a sworn written statement, and those who were married 
to the child's mother before the child was six months old.52 
Additionally, an unwed father could enter his name in New York's 
putative father registry.53 Lehr neither registered nor complied 
with the statute. In order to block the adoption, he commenced 
a proceeding in a New York state court to challenge the statute.54 
49. !d. at 395-96. 
50. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
51. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 249-50. At first glance, Lehr appears similar to 
the situation referred to by Justice Powell in Caban in which a natural father is not 
eligible for application of the equal protection clause. Caban, 441 U.S. at 392. However, 
Lehr was not decided on equal protection grounds but on due process grounds. Lehr had 
originally made a gender-based equal protection claim, arguing that the New York law 
which denied fathers of nonmarital children the right to veto adoption while granting 
mothers such a right violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 255. But while Lehr was 
pending in the lower New York courts, Caban was decided. The dissenters in Caban 
specifically stated that the holding would not be retroactive because of the thousands of 
adoption cases which would be affected by such a result. Caban, 441 U.S. at 415-16. 
Instead Lehr's position was governed by In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 
486 (1975), the case which Caban overruled. Thus, the equal protection claim was not 
before the Supreme Court in Lehr. 
52. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251. 
53. Id. at 250-51 n.4 (citing N.Y. Soc. SERVo LAW S 372-<: (McKinney Supp. 1982-
83)). 
54. Id. at 253. A month after the adoption proceeding commenced in Ulster County, 
New York, Lehr brought a visitation and paternity proceeding in family court in Westch-
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In the United States Supreme Court, Lehr mounted a two-part 
challenge to the New York statutory scheme. First, Lehr argued 
that his relationship with the child constituted a liberty interest 
which could not be destroyed without due process of law.55 
Second, he challenged the state's gender-based classification on 
the ground that he was denied equal protection because he 
received fewer procedural rights than the natural mother.56 
Relying upon Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban, the Court held that 
"the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent 
constitutional protection."57 The Court found that an unwed father 
should demonstrate a full commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood by participating in the rearing of the child and by 
showing a personal interest in the child. In so doing, he would 
gain protection under the fourteenth amendment due process 
clause.58 The Court concluded that New York's statutory scheme 
provided the putative father with adequate methods of protecting 
himself against the adoption of his child.59 In addressing the key 
issue of notice, the Court ruled that the Constitution did not 
require the judge or adverse litigant to give special notice to a 
nonparty who is "presumptively capable of asserting and 
protecting [his] own rights."60 
The Court also rejected Lehr's equal protection claim, finding 
no violation because Lehr had never established a relationship 
with his child. The Court allowed the mother and father in Lehr 
ester County. New York. Lehr served the mother's lawyer and advised the court hearing 
the adoption of the paternity proceeding he had brought in the family court in Westchester 
County. ld. at 252. The court hearing the adoption stayed the out-of-county paternity 
proceeding until it could rule on a motion to change the venue of that proceeding to 
Ulster county. ld. at 252-53. A few days later. when Lehr's attorney called the judge 
hearing the adoption proceeding to advise the judge of his plan to seek a stay of the 
adoption. the judge informed the lawyer that he had signed the adoption order earlier 
that day. ld. at 253. Incredibly. the judge stated that he had known of the pending 
paternity petition but did not believe that he was required to give notice. Lehr lost in 
the New York courts despite the obvious unfairness of these events. See In re Jessica 
XX, 54 N.Y.2d 417. 430 N.E.2d 896, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1981). 
55. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 255. 
56. ld. 
57. ld. at 261. 
58. ld. The distinction between unmarried fathers who have established a bond with 
their nonmarital children and those who have not has been described as the distinction 
between "developed" relationships as in Stanley and Cahan and "potential" relationships 
as in Quilloin. Doskow, Tlu3 Constitution, Notice, and the Sins oj the Fathers. 8 J. Juv. L. 
12, 14 (1984). 
59. Lehr. 463 U.S. at 262-63 nn.18-19. 
60. ld. at 265. 
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to be treated differently because there was a substantial 
relationship between the disparate treatment and the state's 
important purpose of promoting the best interests of the child.61 
This purpose prevails when the father has not established a 
substantial relationship with the child and thus is not in a similar 
position to the mother.62 
The dissenting Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun would 
have found that the putative father was nonetheless entitled to 
procedural due process protections in the form of notice and 
opportunity to be heard.63 They believed that the nature of the 
interest at stake, the interest of a natural parent in his or her 
child, gives rise to due process protections. The dissenters rejected 
the majority's position that the parental relationship mayor may 
not be a protected interest depending on the particular facts of 
the case.64 Specifically, they rejected the majority view that the 
biological relationship alone does not give rise to an interest 
which is protected by procedural due process.65 Rather, the 
dissenters viewed the biological relationship as an interest which 
gives rise to due process protections; "how well developed that 
relationship has become goes to its 'weight' not its 'nature.' "66 
Finally, because the dissenters found a violation of due process, 
they did not reach the equal protection argument.67 
Lehr demonstrates that a putative father's due process and 
equal protection challenges will not succeed when the father has 
made no effort to legitimate his child prior to the adoption. The 
states can and indeed have drafted statutes that set out objective 
understandable tests which the putative father must meet to 
have standing to contest an adoption.6s The New York statute in 
61. [d. at 266. 
62. [d. at 267 -68. 
63. [d. at 268, 276 (White, J., dissenting). 
64. [d. at 269-70. 
65. [d. at 271-73. The Supreme Court's two-step due process analysis has been 
repeated in numerous contexts. The Court first decides whether due process applies by 
determining whether a liberty or property interest is implicated, and if so, what process 
is due. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1973); Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 570-72 (1972). 
66. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 272. 
67. [d. at 276. 
68. See Shoe craft v. Catholic Social Servo Bureau, 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986); 
see also Note, Ne1:traska's Five-Day Statute of Limitations far Unwed Fathers, 67 NEB. L. 
REV. 408 (1988) (suggesting that the Nebraska statute may not pass constitutional muster) 
[hereinafter Fit'e-Day Statute]. For additional analyses, see Comment, Domestic Relations 
-Parental Rights of the Putative Father: Equal Protecticn and Due Process Considerations, 
13
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Lehr provides a good example of a standard against which the 
courts should have no difficulty evaluating the father's efforts.69 
The Lehr standard is also beneficial to the nonmarital child 
because it requires the father to have some substantial 
involvement with the child in order to contest the adoption. Legal 
authority as well as social morality suggest that such lack of 
contact is contrary to the child's best interests.70 A comparison 
of the relationships between the fathers and children in Caban 
and Lehr supports this conclusion. In Caban, the father, mother, 
and two children lived together as a natural family for several 
years, and the father participated in the care and support of his 
children.71 This situation did not exist in Lehr because the putative 
father, whose paternity the mother denied at all times, had no 
14 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 259 (1984) [hereinafter Domestic Relations]; Riesenburger, Paternity: 
Status of the Law in Flmida, 62 FLA. BAR J. 61 (Nov. 1988); and Comment, The Unwed 
Father and Adoption in Utah: A Proposal for Statutory Reform, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 115. 
69. The New York statute considered in Lehr provided: 
Persons entitled to notice, pursuant to subdivision one of this section, shall 
include: 
(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this state to be the father of 
the child; 
(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of 
the United States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the 
court order has been filed with the putative father registry, pursuant to 
section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law; 
(c) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked notice of intent to 
claim paternity of the child, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two 
of the social services law; 
(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the 
child's father; 
(e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother 
at the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be 
the child's father; 
(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother 
in written, sworn statement; and 
(g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six months 
subsequent to the birth of the child and prior to the execution of a surrender 
instrument or the initiation of a proceeding pursuant to section three hundred 
eighty-four-b of the social services law. 
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251-52 (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw SS 111-a(2), (3) (McKinney 1977 
& Supp. 1982-83)}. 
70. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. 261-62 n.17; Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 405 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); M. LAMB, THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 437, 
479 (1981). The father's involvement prior to the birth of the child may also be significant. 
See Five-Day Statute, supra note 68, at 420; Domestic Relations, .mpra note 68, at 266-
67; Buchanan, The Constit1ttional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. 
Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1984). 
71. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389. 
14
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contact with the child from birth to the commencement of the 
adoption proceeding which the father sought to challenge.72 
However, under Lehr, a putative father who is prevented from 
establishing a relationship with his child and who, despite his 
best efforts, cannot comply with the notice requirements, will 
lack standing to challenge his child's adoption. This result may 
be viewed as harsh from the vantage point of the putative father, 
but as both pragmatic and beneficial from the standpoint of the 
child. 
The court in In re Baby Girl M.73 recently raised the question 
of whether such a harsh result is constitutional. Although the 
United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a 
properly presented federal question,74 an analysis of the case is 
instructive. The mother and father of Baby Girl M. dated, and 
when the relationship ended, neither knew that the woman was 
pregnant.75 When the child was born, the mother immediately 
sought to have her adopted. She never informed the father of 
the pregnancy and only informed him of the birth of the child 
two weeks after it occurred. At that time, the father attempted 
to contact the San Diego Department of Social Services to 
determine his rights.76 However, after the mother relinquished 
her rights, the state commenced termination of parental rights 
proceedings despite the fact that the father had sought custody 
after the child was placed with prospective adoptive parents.77 
When the father sought custody of the child, the trial court 
held that such placement would not be in the best interests of 
the child.78 On appeal, the California Supreme Court remanded, 
holding that detriment to the child had to be established before 
a best interest standard could be applied.79 The trial court 
72. Lehr, 463 u.s. at 250; In re Jessica XX, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 430 N.E.2d 896, 446 
N.Y.S.2d 20 (1981). For an analysis of putative fathers' rights under state adoption 
statutes through 1985, see Note, Removing the Bar Sinister: Adoption Rights of Putative 
Fatlu:rs, 15 CU~tB. L. REV. 499 (1985). 
73. In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984). 
74. McNamara v. County of San Diego Dep't of Social Serv., 57 U.S.L.W. 4041 (1989) 
(No. 87·5840). 
75. In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 68, 688 P.2d at 920, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 311. 
76. !d. 
77. !d. At the hearing the plaintiff, McNamara, was found to be the biological father. 
The subject of child custody involving nonmarital children is beyond the scope of this 
article. See Note, Child Custody Law: Custody Presumptions Favoring One Parent May 
Impair the Child's Best Interests, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 187 (1986). 
78. See In re Baby Girl M., 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 661 (1987). 
79. lit re Baby Girl Moo 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984). 
15
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considered expert testimony and held that granting custody to 
the father would be psychologically damaging to the child because 
she had grown accustomed to her prospective adoptive parents 
who had cared for her since her placement shortly after birth.so 
The father appealed this decision to the California Court of 
Appeal, asserting that his fitness, rather than the child's detriment, 
was the issue, and his fitness was not disputed. The court of 
appeal acknowledged the father's interest, but held the interest 
of the child superior.81 
The putative father in In re Baby Girl M. raised two issues 
before the Supreme Court, both based on equal protection 
grounds.82 First, he argued that termination of his parental rights 
solely on the basis of best interests of the child was a denial of 
equal protection when he had shown significant interest in the 
child. Second, the father contended that termination of parental 
rights without a showing of lack of parental ability was a denial 
of equal protection. He argued that the mother of the child was 
not treated similarly. It would appear that the Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal because these issues were not raised by 
the father in the lower court. In re Baby Girl M. also raised the 
unresolved question in Lehr, whether the unwed father and child 
have any procedural rights to establish a relationship with each 
other when they have thus far been prevented from doing SO.83 
Doubtless, this issue will come before the Court again. 
The rights of a putative father and his child are again before 
the Court in a different context. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,54 the 
issue involves the constitutionality of a California statute which 
contains a conclusive presumption, subject to three limited 
exceptions, that a child of a married woman who is cohabitating 
with her husband is the child of the marriage.85 The three 
exceptions are when the husband is impotent or sterile, or when 
the husband alone, or the wife together with the biological father, 
petition for a blood test to determine paternity within two years 
80. See In re Baby Girl M., 236 Cal. Rptr. at 662. 
81. Id. at 665. 
82. 57 U.S.L.W. 3030 (1989) (No. 87·5840). 
83. For a further discussion of this issue see Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Servo Bureau, 
222 Neb. 574 (1986); Comment, Adoption and the Putative Father's Rights: Shoecraft V. 
Catholic Social Services Bureau, 13 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 231 (1988); and Five·Day Statute, 
supra note 68. 
84. 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988). 
85. Michael H. V. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1007-08, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 818; CAL. 
EVID. CODE S 621 (West Supp. 1989). 
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of the birth of the child.56 Thus, a biological father who is not 
married to the mother may be absolutely precluded from 
establishing paternity under the California law. 
Michael H. involves questions of both equal protection and due 
process.87 In this reverse paternity case, the unwed father's equal 
protection argument is based on a claim that the irrebuttable 
presumption treats the father of a child by a married woman 
cohabitating with another man at the time of conception and 
birth differently than other parents. Thus, the father in Michael 
H. argues that he has been denied the ability to prove that he 
is the biological father and so vindicate his parental rights to a 
relationship with the child. He claims that this irrebuttable 
presumption allows gender-based discrimination.55 Such 
discrimination is prohibited by the Court's holding in Cahan.59 
In addition, the unwed father claims that he has a right to a 
relationship with his child which may not be terminated by the 
state in the absence of due process.90 The Court has been asked 
to decide whether there is a fundamental interest in the familial 
relationship between the unwed father and child, and if so, what 
procedures should be made available to protect that interest.91 
86. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989), which provides that unless blood 
tests show otherwise, "the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not 
impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage." 
87. Dale, Tlu' Presumption that the Husband Is the Father of His Wife's Child: Should 
It be Conclusive? 1988-1989 ABA Previr::w of the United States Supreme Court Cases 41. 
Michael H. is also important because it involves the underlying issue of the best interests 
of the child. At what point does the forced intervention of a biological but unknown 
father overcome the countervailing considerations of what upbringing is best for the 
child? Although the answer on a psychological level is imprecise, at some point the 
Supreme Court will have to decide this question on a due process or equal protection 
basis. 
88. Id. at 42. 
89. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
90. Id. at 1008-09, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 817. 
91. The basic case relied upon in support of the appellant's position is Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
Significantly, the child in Michael H. makes the same claim that the conclusive pre-
sumption denies due process rights. Cases used to support the child's argument are 
Rivera v. Minnich, 107 S. Ct. 3001, 3004 (1987) and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-
34 (1979). The California Court of Appeal rejected the child's due process argument in 
Michael H., finding that the state's interest outweighed those of the child. Michael H., 
191 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 818. Noting the state's interest in preserving 
and protecting the developed parent/child relationship, the court found that the welfare 
of the child would be harmed if she were permitted to rebut the conclusive presumption 
of legitimacy. Id., 236 Cal. Rptr. at 819. 
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But what if the putative father does not wish to be recognized 
as the parent of an illegitimate child? What are the rights of 
parents, child, and state under these circumstances? This issue 
arose in a 1987 Supreme Court paternity case, Rivera v. Minnich,92 
which demonstrated that the state is also interested in having 
the rights of putative fathers adjudicated for purposes of 
inheritance and other benefits. 
In Rivera, the mother, an unmarried minor, gave birth to a 
baby and two weeks later filed a complaint in the Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court seeking support for her son.93 
Because the mother was receiving public assistance, the case was 
brought with the assistance of the Pennsylvania authorities, who 
based their efforts to obtain support on the Social Security Act 
provisions governing aid to families with dependent children.94 
At a subsequent paternity proceeding, the putative father, Rivera, 
was represented by counsel. At that proceeding, Rivera filed a 
motion challenging the burden of proof standard set out in the 
Pennsylvania statute.95 He claimed that the standard should be 
proof by clear and convincing evidence rather than the state's 
standard of preponderance of the evidence.96 Additionally, he 
argued that the Pennsylvania statute violated the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution and requested that the jury be charged pursuant to 
the clear and convincing evidence standard.97 
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court upheld the 
preponderance of the evidence standard against Rivera's due 
process challenge.98 The significance of the case lies in the Court's 
balancing of the interests of the mother, child, and state. The 
Court in Rivera, relying on previous opinions including Santosky 
v. Kramer,99 Quilloin v. Walcott,lOO and Mathews v. Eldridge,IOI had 
little trouble determining that a fair balance was met by a 
92. 107 S. Ct. 3001 (1987). 
93. Rivera v. Minnich, 107 S. Ct. at 3002. 
94. 42 U.S.C. § 654(4) (1982). 
95. Rivera, 107 S. Ct. at 3002. 
96. Id. at 3002-03. 
97. Id. at 3003. 
98. Id. In the majority of states, the standard to be met by the nonmarital child is 
preponderance of the evidence; other states such as New York require proof by clear 
and convincing evidence. Id. 
99. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
100. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
101. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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preponderance test.102 The majority concluded that to do otherwise 
would provide protections to the putative father more extensive 
than those available to the other parties and interested entities 
when there was no justification for such preferential treatment.103 
II. INHERITANCE 
Since 1977 the Supreme Court has decided three cases involving 
the standards by which a nonmarital child may inherit from his 
father.104 While holding that nonmarital children may not be 
precluded absolutely from seeking to inherit, the Court has 
upheld differences in the inheritance standards between marital 
and nonmarital children. These cases have turned on an application 
of equal protection standards. 
The seminal case, Trimble v. Gordon,lo5 involved a challenge to 
the constitutionality of the Illinois Probate Act, which provided 
that nonmarital children could inherit by intestate succession 
from their mothers but not from their putative fathers.I06 However, 
the Illinois law allowed marital children to inherit by intestate 
succession from both their mothers and fathers. The appellant in 
Trimble was the daughter of a man who had lived with the child's 
mother and then died intestate.lo7 Before the man's death, the 
Circuit Court of Cook County had entered a paternity order 
determining that he was the child's father and ordering him to 
pay support. The father did support the child until his death and 
left an estate consisting only of a 1976 Plymouth automobile 
worth $2500.108 The child's mother brought a probate action to 
102. Riwra, 107 S. Ct. at 3004-06. 
103. Id. at 3006. Only Justice Brennan dissented from the majority. He concluded that 
the putative father's financial interests, the unwanted creation of a life-long cultural and 
moral role, and the social stigma involved all gave rise to a significant protected interest. 
/d. at 3006-07. Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded that the putative father's liability 
and property interests required a more demanding standard of proof. Id. at 3007. 
104. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852 (1986); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble 
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
105. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
106. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 764-65. Section 2-2 of the illinois Probate Act states: 
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor and 
of any person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the 
lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take 
by descent any estate which the parent would have taken, if living. A child 
who was illegitimate whose parent intermarry and who is acknowledged by 
the father as the father's child is legitimate. 
ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 110 1/2, S 2-2 (Smith-Hurd 1978). 
107. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 764. 
108. /d. 
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recover the automobile, but the illinois courts upheld the probate 
statute and ruled that as an illegitimate child, the daughter had 
no right to share in her father's estate. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding the statute 
an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause.109 The 
crux of the opinion was the finding that the standard for evaluating 
this state law was less than strict scrutiny but more than rational 
basis.no The Court used this intermediate test to evaluate the 
discrimination against the professed purpose of the probate 
statute.111 
The state made two arguments in support of the statute -
promotion of family relationships and orderly disposition of 
property.ll2 The Court relied upon earlier cases and held that it 
was unjust to punish the child for the failure of either of her 
parents to conduct themselves in accordance with society at large 
and its moral rules.u3 While finding that the state's need to 
provide for orderly disposition of property at death was legitimate, 
the Court ruled that the particular statute did not accomplish 
this purpose in constitutional fashion. ll4 The Court concluded that 
although the state had a legitimate interest in protecting against 
"spurious claims of paternity," this law impermissibly precluded 
the claims of nonmarital children.u5 
Within a year, Lalli v. Lalli116 raised the closer and more 
difficult question of to what degree the state could treat nonmarital 
children differently in terms of intestate succession. In Lalli, the 
nonmarital son of Mario Lalli brought an action for a compulsory 
109. Id. at 765-66. 
110. Id. at 766-67. The Court premised its application of the intermediate equal 
protection test on Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co .• 406 U.S. 164. 172 (1972). which 
held that at a minimum. such a statutory classification must bear a rational relationship 
to a legitimate state interest and on Mathews v. Lucas. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). which held 
that such classifications are not suspect and therefore are not tested against a standard 
of strict scrutiny. Id. Justice Rehnquist dissented in Trimble. advocating the application 
of a rational basis test. Id. at 786. 
111. Id. at 766-67. 
112. Id. at 768-70. 
113. Id. at 770. Despite the Court's failure to overrule explicitly Labine v. Vincent. 401 
U.S. 532 (1971). it is hard to reconcile the more recent cases with this earlier decision. 
See Trimble. 430 U.s. at 776 n.17. See also W. WEYRAUCH AND S. KATZ. AMERICAN FAMILY 
LAW IN TRANSITION 598-602 (1983). 
114. Trimble. 430 U.S. at 771-73. 
115. Id. at 776. 
116. 439 U.S. 259 (1978). For a discussion of this case see Comment. fllegitimates and 
Equal Protection: Lalli v. Lalli-A Retreat From Trimble v. Gordon. 57 DEN. U.L.J. 453 
(1980). 
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accounting of the administration of his father's estate, claiming 
that he was entitled to inherit from his father who died intestate.ll7 
Although the son had not obtained a filiation order during his 
putative father's lifetime as required by New York's probate law, 
he argued that there was substantial evidence of his relationship 
with his father .118 In support of his position, he submitted a 
notarized statement from his father, which consented to the son's 
marriage and referred to him as the father's son. The son also 
filed several other affidavits which stated that the father often 
had said that the appellant was his child.l19 
In a plurality opinion, the Court employed the same equal 
protection test outlined in Trimble.120 The Court analyzed the 
requirement that the putative father be declared the father in a 
paternity proceeding prior to his death. The plurality found the 
statute constitutional. because it was related to an important 
state interest-the orderly disposition of property at death.121 
The dissenters, however, found the case indistinguishable from 
Trimble, arguing that the statute could be redrafted to allow a 
nonmarital child to prove the paternity of the father by other 
means.122 
The Court reaffirmed the Trimble test in the most recent 
inheritance case, Reed v. Campbell.l23 In Reed, a nonmarital 
daughter attempted to inherit from her putative father by 
intervening in an ongoing probate proceeding. The estate 
proceeding had been commenced prior to the Trimble decision, 
although the daughter's effort to intervene occurred after Trimble. 
The Supreme Court simply said that the two dates had no impact 
upon the fact that the state statute was constitutionally invalid.124 
117. Lalli v. Lalli. 439 U.S. at 261. 
118. ld. at 261-62. The probate law stated that: 
An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his 
issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has. during 
the lifetime of the father. made an order of filiation declaring paternity in 
a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two 
years from the birth of the child. 
ld. (quoting N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW S 4-1.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1967)). 
119. ld. at 262-63. 
120. ld. at 264-65. 
121. !d. at 268. 275. 
122. ld. at 278-79. The dissenters also concluded that the majority's argument that 
the New York statute protected the state from claims by unknown nonmarital children 
was tenuous at best. 
123. 476 U.S. 852 (1986). 
124. Reed v. Campbell. 476 U.S. at 856. 
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The inheritance cases demonstrate that when the government 
is a conduit for the resolution of disputes between private parties 
rather than a party to the dispute, the Court will not allow the 
government to discriminate between marital and nonmarital 
children absent a significant governmental interest. In inheritance 
cases, the government may prevail against a nonmarital child by 
demonstrating the need for a system of orderly disposition of 
property at death. However, the Court has approved statutory 
limitations on the rights of a nonmarital child in probate matters 
when the putative father has not been declared the child's father 
in a paternity proceeding prior to death. Contrary to the 
dissenters' argument in Lalli that such a requirement makes it 
virtually impossible for a child who has been fully supported by 
a putative father to inherit from him,125 the Court seems willing 
to allow such a difference in treatment as a legitimate 
governmental prerogative. Thus, unless the state statute requires 
less, a filiation order may be a prerequisite to a nonmarital child's 
right to inherit from the putative father. 
III. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
The third subject of Supreme Court rulings involves the rights 
of nonmarital children to various sources of child support, both 
public and private. As the following analysis demonstrates, the 
Court has been more protective of the interests of children when 
private child support is involved than when government benefits 
are at issue. A series of four cases decided between 1974 and 
1980 illustrates the Court's reaction to nonmarital children seeking 
public money.126 
A. Government Benefits 
In Jimenez v. Weinberger,127 the Court addressed the right of 
a disabled worker's nonmarital children to Social Security 
insurance benefits. At issue in Jimenez was a section of the Social 
Security Act which provided that certain nonmarital children 
were not entitled to insurance benefits through their disabled 
fathers. These children were those whose fathers' paternity could 
125. Lalli. 439 U.S. at 278. 
126. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23 (1980); Califano v. Boles. 443 U.S. 282 (1979); 
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
127. 417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
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not be proven through acknowledgement by the father or affirmed 
by evidence of domicile and support by the father prior to the 
onset of his disability.l28 In Jimenez, the Court rejected an absolute 
bar to such benefits for this particular group of nonmarital 
children because the Act covered other nonmarital children.l29 
The Court held that there was no rational statutory basis upon 
which to deny these "after born" children the right to establish 
their fathers' paternity.130 The Secretary of the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare attempted to justify the conclusive 
exclusion by arguing that the provision prevented spurious 
claims.l31 The problem with the Secretary's position was its 
failure to recognize that the claims by nonmarital children covered 
by the Act could be equally spurious.132 The Court held the 
section invalid, finding two sub-classes of nonmarital children, 
one conclusively denied benefits and the other presumptively 
allowed benefits, and no justification for the distinction.133 
Mathews 1-'. Lucasl34 involved a Social Security Act provision 
which related to the eligibility of certain nonmarital children for 
survivorship benefits. Despite the holding in Jimenez, the Court 
rejected the equal protection challenge of the nonmarital children 
in Mathews. A comparison of Jimenez and Mathews demonstrates 
the tension in this area and the imprecision in the Court's 
analyses. 
The statute challenged in Mathews required certain nonmarital 
children to prove that the deceased wage earner was their father 
and, at the time of his death, was living with and contributing 
to their support.135 There was a presumption of dependency for 
marital children and for those nonmarital children whose fathers 
had acknowledged the children as their offspring, had been 
judicially declared the fathers, or had been ordered to support 
the children.1OO The Court distinguished Jimenez in rejecting the 
128. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. at 631 n.2. 
129. ]d. The Social Security Act provided that nonmarital children who could inherit 
under the intestacy laws of their father's domicile and children unable to inherit only 
because their parents' ceremonial marriage was invalid for nonobvious defects were 
entitled to benefits "without any further shOwing of parental support." Id. See also 42 
U.S.C. S 416(h)(3) (1982). 
130. Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 636. 
131. Id. at 635. 
132. Id. at 636. 
133. Id. at 637. 
134. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
135. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 498 nn.1-2 (citing 42 U.s.C. S 402(d)(1), (3) (1970)). 
136. Id. at 498-99. 
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equal protection challenge. The Court found that the nonmarital 
children in Jimenez had been "conclusively" denied benefits and 
justified the denial of benefits in Mathews because it was not 
conclusive.l37 The nonmarital children could qualify for the benefits 
by proving support and cohabitation at the time of the wage 
earner's death.l38 Furthermore, the Court found the difference in 
treatment was based upon the legitimate governmental purpose 
of requiring that the survivors have been dependent upon the 
deceased wage earner .139 
Justice Stevens' dissent found Jimenez indistinguishable.140 He 
believed that the majority actually did not find the distinction 
justified, but rather based its decision on the opinion that a 
governmental agency's need for administrative convenience ought 
to be accepted as an adequate reason to treat two groups 
differently.141 Stevens concluded that administrative convenience 
is a pretext for the belief "that illegitimates are less deserving 
persons than legitimates."142 
The issue of Social Security benefits again came before the 
Supreme Court in Califano v. Boles,143 a nationwide class action 
in which nonmarital children and their unmarried mothers 
challenged Section 202(g)(1) of the Social Security Act.144 In a 
137. fd. at 512. 
138. fd. 
139. fd. at 516. 
140. fd. at 516-18. 
141. fd. at 522. 
142. fd. at 523. 
143. 443 U.S. 282 (1979). 
144. The statute provides: 
(1) The widow and every surviving divorced mother (as defined in section 
416(d) of this title) of an individual who died a fully or currently insured 
individual, if such widow or surviving divorced mother-
(A) is not married, 
(B) is not entitled to a widow's insurance benefit, 
(e) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or is entitled to old-age 
insurance benefits each of which is less than three-fourths of the primary 
insurance amount of such individual, 
(D) has filed application for mother's insurance benefits, or was entitled 
to wife's insurance benefits on the basis of the wages and self-employment 
income of such individual for the month preceding the month in which he 
died, 
(E) at the time of filing such application has in her care a child or such 
individual entitled to a child's insurance benefit, and 
(F) in the case of a surviving divorced mother -
(i) the child referred to in subparagraph (E) is her son, daughter or 
legally adopted child, and 
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close decision, the Court ruled that the Act's restriction limiting 
mothers' insurance benefits to widows and divorced wives of 
wage earners was not a denial of equal protection.145 The majority 
concluded that a rational basis existed for distinguishing between 
surviving parents who were married and those who were not 
married.146 According to the Court, Congress reasonably could 
have decided that a woman who had never married the wage 
earner was less likely to be dependent on the wage earner at 
the time of his death than was the one who was married.147 In 
addition, the Court found that the children's benefits from their 
parent's receipt of Social Security benefits were only 
"incidental,"148 and the impact of the denial of benefits on the 
children was "speculative."149 
The dissenters viewed the case as an equal protection challenge 
involving nonmarital children rather than unmarried spouses. 
They would have found that Congress designed the mothers' 
insurance benefits program to aid the children; therefore, the 
denial of support to nonmarital children bore no substantial 
(iii the benefits referred to in such subparagraph are payable on the 
basis of such individual's wages and self-employment income, 
shall (subject to subsection (s) of this section) be entitled to a mother's 
insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after August 
1950 in which she becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits and ending 
with the month preceding the first month in which any of the following 
occurs: no child of such deceased individual is entitled to a child's insurance 
benefit, such widow or surviving divorced mother becomes entitled to an 
old·age insurance benefit equal to or exceeding three·fourths of the primary 
insurance amount of such deceased individual, she becomes entitled to a 
widow's insurance benefit, she remarries, or she dies. Entitlement to such 
benefits shall also end, in the case of a surviving divorced mother, with the 
month immediately preceding the first month in which no son, daughter, or 
legally adopted child of such surviving divorced mother is entitled to a child's 
insurance benefit on the basis of the wages and self-employment income of 
such deceased individual. 
42 U.S.C. S 402{g)(1) (1982). 
145. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. at 295-96. The statute was upheld by a margin of 
five to four. 
146. Ill. at 294. 
147. Ill. at 289. 
148. Id. at 295. 
149. !d. at 296. Underlying the Justices' dispute over the identity of the intended 
beneficiaries is Justice Rehnquist's change of opinion from Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 
420 U.S. 636 (1975) to Califano. In Weinberger, Rehnquist specifically found that the 
purpose of section 202{g) was to provide benefits to children. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 655 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). In Califano, Rehnquist explicitly recanted. Califano, 443 U.S. 
at 294-95 n.12. 
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relation to the Act's purpose.I50 Because the discrimination 
involved a non marital statute, the dissenters applied the 
intermediate equal protection test.l5l The dissenters would have 
found that the children could recover under the ActYill In addition, 
the dissenters suggested that the majority failed to heed its own 
admonition that it is impermissible for the state to penalize the 
nonmarital child for conduct and status that the child could not 
prevent.I53 
The Califano dissent demonstrates that equal protection 
challenges by nonmarital children in government benefit cases 
are subject to inconsistent applications of equal protection 
standards and various interpretations of legislative history. What 
accounts for the difference between the majority and minority 
in the reading of the statute? Given the Court's willingness to 
reject distinctions between marital and nonmarital children in 
private finance contexts, the answer may relate to how comfortable 
a particular Justice feels in spending public money. 
The Court's statutory interpretation was important in deciding 
a nonmarital child's entitlement to survivor's benefits under the 
Civil Service Retirement Act. In United States v. Clark,I54 the 
nonmarital children were denied benefits because, although they 
once had lived with a government employee in a family 
relationship, they were not living with him at the time of his 
death. The Civil Service Act required that a child "live with" a 
government employee in order to claim survivor's benefits. The 
Civil Service Commission interpreted this term to mean that the 
child must live with the employee at the time of the employee's 
death.I55 The children argued that the denial of benefits constituted 
impermissible discrimination against nonmarital children. The 
Court did not reach the equal protection argument because its 
interpretation of the statute allowed a decision in favor of the 
children.I56 The Court studied the language, intent, and history 
of the Civil Service Retirement Act and could find nothing to 
150. Califarw, 443 U.S. at 297 -98 (Marshall, J., dissenting!. 
151. The dissent cited Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 
417 U.S. 628 (1974); and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) in 
support of its application of the intermediate standard. Id. at 302, 304 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
152. Id. at 300. 
153. Id. at 303-04. 
154. 445 U.S. 23 (1980). 
155. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. at 28. 
156. Id. at 27 -28. 
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limit the term "live with" to the time of the employee's death.157 
The concurring opinion, while reading the statutory language 
regarding "live with" differently than the majority, did not require 
the child to live with the employee at the employee's death. 
Rather, the concurring Justices believed that "live with" was 
Congress' way of requiring a showing of dependency.l58 Justices 
Rehnquist and Stewart restricted their dissent to the simple 
proposition that the case should have been remanded to the 
Court of Claims for an initial consideration of the statutory 
claim.l59 
Clark teaches that the Court will side with nonmarital children 
when a governmental financial support statute contains no 
language or legislative history supportive of an interpretation 
which would treat nonmarital and marital children differently. 
Even at the risk of obligating the government to expend larger 
sums of money, the Court will not differentiate between children 
in this situation and will avoid reaching and deciding an equal 
protection challenge.16o 
However, in other government benefits cases in which the 
statute clearly provides for discrimination between marital and 
nonmarital children, the Court will reach the equal protection 
question. The problem with the Court's interpretation of the 
equal protection standard in these cases has been that the various 
members of the Court use incomplete and divergent standards 
for determining whether the statute is a violation of equal 
protection either on its face or based upon its legislative history. 
The various Justices can find support for a particular position 
which either supports or opposes the interests of the nonmarital 
children. This ad hoc analysis of the cases is troublesome. First, 
the analysis makes predicting future determinations in the area 
extremely difficult. Second, the reasoning of the Court seems to 
be based in part upon the Justices' attitudes toward governmental 
expenditures. 
157. Id. at 31. Even if the Court had found such a limitation, the majority recognized 
that it would then have to deal with an equal protection claim. Statutory construction, 
as the Court explicitly noted, is used to avoid constitutional violations by "adopting a 
saving statutory construction not at odds with fundamental legislative purposes." Id. 
158. Clark, 445 U.S. at 35 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). 
159. !d. at 37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
160. For equal protection claims in this context, the test is whether the classification 
bears a substantial relationship to the interest which the statute is to serve and whether 
a classification is substantially related to a permissible state interest. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 
U.S. 259, 265, 268 (1978). 
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B. Child Support 
The Supreme Court also has dealt with the nonmarital child's 
interests in financial matters in the context of child support. In 
a series of four cases, Gomez v. Perez,16I Mills v. Habluetzel,162 
Pickett v. Brown,163 and Clark v. Jeter,164 the Court faced equal 
protection challenges based upon claimed discrimination resulting 
from the imposition of statutes of limitations against nonmarital 
children in child support cases. 
In the first case, Gomez, the Court faced the basic question of 
whether Texas law allowed marital children a judicially enforceable 
right to support from their natural fathers while denying 
nonmarital children the same right.165 In a per curiam opinion, 
the Court rejected the statutory distinction on equal protection 
grounds, finding that "a state may not invidiously discriminate 
against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits 
accorded children generally."166 The Court recognized that Gomez 
also raised "lurking problems" regarding the ability to prove 
paternity within the statute of limitationsI67 but concluded that 
such problems could not create impenetrable barriers to the 
enforcement of support by nonmarital children.l68 
The statute of limitations issue surfaced several years later in 
Mills v. Habluetzel. 169 Mills involved a challenge to a Texas statute 
of limitations which required that a suit by a nonmarital child 
seeking to identify his natural father be brought before the child 
was one year old.170 The state argued that the statute of limitations 
protected against stale or fraudulent claims.l7l The Court applied 
161. 409 U.S. 535 (1973). 
162. 456 U.S. 91 (1982). 
163. 462 U.S. 1 (1983). 
164. 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988). 
165. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. at 535. 
166. Id. at 538. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. 456 U.S. 91 (1982). TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. S 13.01 (Vernon 1986) provided: "A suit 
to establish the parent-child relationship between a child who is not the legitimate child 
of a man and the child's natural father by proof of paternity must be brought before the 
child is one year old, or the suit is barred." Id. See also O'Brien, Illegitirruu:y: Suggestion 
For Reform Following Mills v. Habluetzel, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 79 (1983). 
170. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.s. at 92. In Mills, the mother and the local welfare 
department to whom she had assigned the child's support rights brought a paternity 
proceeding against the alleged father of her child. Id. at 95-96. The mother lost at trial 
because the court imposed the one-year statute of limitations; the child was one year and 
seven months old at the commencement of the lawsuit. Id. at 96. 
171. Id. at 92. 
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its well-established test that in nonmarital situations, a statutory 
restriction may survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent 
that it is substantially related to a legitimate state interest.172 
The Court's analysis involved the two related requirements of 
providing the nonmarital child with a sufficient time period within 
which to present a claim and establishing an appropriate time 
limit which would allow the state to prevent loss of evidence or 
avoid fraudulent claims.173 Applying this test, the Court held that 
there was a denial of equal protection because the time frame 
was unrealistically short given the finality of the result. Although 
marital children could seek support at any time until the age of 
eighteen, the twelve-month period available to nonmarital children 
would make many of these children unable to seek support. The 
Court recognized that avoiding fraudulent claims was a legitimate 
state interest but found that this interest was not substantial 
enough to overcome the child's equal protection claim.174 
A two-year statute of limitations for paternity and child support 
actions was at issue in Pickett v. Bro'UJ'Yl,.175 In Pickett, the Court 
applied Mills and concluded that the two-year period to bring 
the action for child support was also insufficient.176 The Court 
again recognized that the possibility of fraudulent claims was a 
legitimate state interest but noted that scientific advances in 
blood testing had reduced further the likelihood of fraudulent 
claims.177 
Pickett and Mills did not define the period that would suffice 
as a statute of limitations in paternity or child support proceedings. 
The language in Mills was vague: "The period for asserting the 
right to support must be sufficiently long to permit those who 
normally have an interest in such children to bring an action on 
their behalf despite the difficult personal, family, and financial 
circumstances that often surround the birth of a child outside of 
172. ld. at 99. By deciding the case on equal protection grounds, the Court did not 
reach Mills' due process claim. ld. at 96-97. 
173. ld. at 99-100. 
174. ld. at 100. 
175. 462 U.S. 1 (1983). The Supreme Court had ruled nine years earlier that once a 
state sets up a cause of action for child support, it may not deny the same cause of 
action to nonmarital children. Gomez v. Perez. 409 U.S. 535 (1973). To do so violates the 
equal protection clause. ld. at 537 -38. ' 
176. Pickett v. Brown. 462 U.S. at 11-13. As in Milk, the Court did not reach the 
due process claim. ld. at 11 n.ll. 
177. ld. at 17-18. See also Rivera v. Minnich. 107 S. Ct. 3001. 3008 (1987) (Brennan. 
J., dissenting). 
29
Dale: The Evolving Constitutional Rights of Nonmarital Children:  Mixed
Published by Reading Room, 1989
HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 552 1988-1989
552 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.5:523 
wedlock."178 However, Justice O'Connor's concurring OpInIOn in 
Mills suggested that perhaps the statute of limitations should be 
similar to other situations in which statutes of limitations are 
tolled during minority.179 
However, subsequent to Pickett, Congress passed the Child 
Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 and settled the 
question of what constitutes a sufficient period of time for 
nonmarital children to raise the issue of paternity.lso Section 
666(aX5) of that law definitively states that each state must 
implement "[p]rocedures which permit the establishment of the 
paternity of any child at any time prior to such child's eighteenth 
birthday."181 
In Clark v. Jeter,182 the Supreme Court avoided the issue of 
whether the Child Support Enforcement Amendments were 
retroactive when codified by the Pennsylvania legislature. Cherlyn 
Clark brought suit in 1983, ten years after the birth of her 
nonmarital daughter but prior to the enactment of the Child 
Support Enforcement Amendments. The putative father moved 
to dismiss, arguing that Pennsylvania's six-year statute of 
limitations barred the suit. The mother responded that the statute 
of limitations violated the due process and equal protection clauses 
of the fourteenth amendment.l83 The trial court upheld Jeter's 
argument, and Clark appealed to the superior court of 
Pennsylvania. 
Before the superior court could rule on the case, the 
Pennsylvania legislature enacted an eighteen-year statute of 
limitations and brought its law into compliance with the Child 
Support Enforcement Amendments; such compliance is required 
if a state participates in the federal child support program.l84 
Clark asked that the case be remanded to decide the question of 
the retroactivity of the new federal statute. On remand, the 
Pennsylvania trial court denied Clark's motion for reargument, 
holding that the statute was not retroactive absent express 
178. Mills, 456 U.S. at 97. 
179. ld. at 104-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
180. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984) (Pub. L. 98· 
378). 
181. 42 U.S.C. S 666(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. ill 1985) (emphasis added). 
182. 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1913 (1988). 
183. Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. at 1913-14. 
184. ld. at 1913. 
30
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol5/iss2/1
HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 553 1988-1989
1989] NONMARITAL CHILDREN 553 
legislative intent.1s5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
subsequently denied Clark's petition for appeaJ.186 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider 
whether Pennsylvania's legislative scheme was discriminatory 
because it allowed a nonmarital child only six years to establish 
paternity for purposes of obtaining support, while permitting a 
marital child to seek support from his parents at any time. 
Because Clark's argument in the lower court did not present 
adequately the issue of whether the new federal law preempted 
the six-year statute of limitations in the lower court, the Supreme 
Court avoided the issue of retroactivity and accepted the state's 
interpretation.187 
However, the Supreme Court proceeded to decide the case on 
the issue of whether the six-year statute of limitations violated 
the equal protection clause. The Court relied on its holdings in 
Pickett and MiUs, in which the Court struck down one- and two-
year statutes of limitations respectively and held that the period 
of time under Pennsylvania law was also too short given the 
emotional and financial problems faced by a mother when raising 
a nonmarital child.l88 Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous 
court in Clark, stated that even a six-year statute of limitations 
does not provide a reasonable time within which to assert a claim 
on behalf of a nonmarital child. In striking down the Pennsylvania 
statute as discriminatory, the Court held that "the period for 
obtaining support . . . must be sufficiently long [and] any time 
limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related 
to the State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or 
fraudulent claims."189 
As a result of Gomez, Mills, Pickett, and Clark, and most 
importantly, Section 666(a)(5) of the Child Support Enforcement 
Amendments, the Supreme Court has allowed paternity and 
support actions to be brought at any time during the child's first 
eighteen years, thus affording a nonmarital child an opportunity 
to assert a claim. The Supreme Court has been deferential to 
mothers who may not realize fully the financial expenses related 
to food, clothing, school, and medical expenses, which increase 
185. Clark v. Jeter, 358 Pa. Super. 550, 518 A.2d 276 (1986). 
186. Clark v. Jeter, 527 A.2d 533 (1987). 
187. Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988). 
188. ]d. at 1914-15; Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. I, 18 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 
U.S. 91, 101 (1982). 
189. Clark, 108 S. Ct. at 1914. 
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substantially as a child develops. This solicitousness seems to be 
at odds with the Court's more narrow response when a nonmarital 
child seeks to intervene in a probate proceeding or seeks 
government support. In those cases, the Court favors the state's 
administrative concerns that require filiation proceedings prior 
to the putative father's death and finds that federal child support 
legislation needs to include nonmarital children explicitly. The 
Court's attitude seems, at best, somewhat inconsistent. 
CONCLUSION 
Several general conclusions can be drawn from the series of 
Supreme Court cases involving paternity, adoption, inheritance, 
and public and private support benefits.190 In the adoption cases, 
a putative father generally cannot prohibit a third party adoption 
by withholding consent unless the putative father has complied 
with one of the legitimation procedures available under the 
particular state statute; this result is subject to the outcome of 
a case now pending.I91 It remains unclear whether the father can 
nonetheless block an adoption by demonstrating that, based upon 
a best interest of the child standard, the child should not be 
adopted. It is clear, however, that the absolute rights vested in 
a married father do not vest in the putative father unless he has 
legitimated the child under the relevant state law. It is unclear 
what role a putative father must play in the life of a child born 
while the mother was married to and living with another man. 
In the context of inheritance by nonmarital children, the Court 
has applied the intermediate equal protection test. Under this 
test, the Court balances the state's interests against the nonmarital 
child's interests. Although the Court firmly rejects states' efforts 
to use probate codes to punish the nonmarital child, the Court 
will recognize some distinction between nonmarital and marital 
children when the interest of the state is in the efficiency of the 
probate process. Therefore, a nonmarital child must move 
190. For issues involving children of unmarried parents other than the three subjects 
discussed in this article. see Little v. Streiter. 452 U.S. 1 (1981). involving the right to 
free blood tests for putative fathers in paternity cases; Fiallo v. Bell. 480 U.S. 7fIT (1977). 
involving nonmarital children and immigration status; Parham v. Hughes. 441 U.S. 347 
(1979). Glona v. American Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co .• 391 U.S. 73 (1968) and Levy v. 
Louisiana. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). all involving the interplay of children of unmarried parents 
and wrongful death action. See also W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ. AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN 
TRANSITION 598-602 (1983). 
191. Michael H. v. Gerald D •• 191 Cal. App. 3d 995. 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987). 
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expeditiously in asserting a claim to the estate and, more 
importantly, in resolving a legitimation or paternity proceeding 
prior to the probate matter. How quickly the child must move is 
yet to be decided by the Court. 
In the area of support benefits, and more particularly in that 
of federal funding, the Court has looked at legislative history 
and, depending upon the viewpoint of the majority, mayor may 
not find a legitimate reason to distinguish between providing 
benefits to nonmarital and marital children. The distinctions are 
subtle, often emanating from the various Justices' philosophies 
of statutory construction and subjective judgments about 
legislative history. In fact, the Court may avoid a constitutional 
decision altogether by deciding the case solely on the basis of 
statutory interpretation. But when the Court has resolved the 
constitutional claim, its equal protection analysis has been 
simplistic and conclusory. Such treatment makes it extremely 
difficult to predict future results. 
Finally, there is good news for nonmarital children in the area 
of private support claims. The combination of the passage of the 
Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 and the Court's 
Cla'rk v. Jeter ruling that the federal law may be applied 
retroactively, effectively gives nonmarital children the period 
until adulthood to seek support from their natural fathers, thereby 
giving them the same protections as marital children. Thus, in 
terms of support benefits the results are mixed. As long as 
private interests are involved, the nonmarital child will do well. 
If, on the other hand, the government is involved, the current 
Court is less likely to rule for the nonmarital child. The result 
may depend upon whose money the Court is spending. 
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